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Faute lourde and the Perfectly 
Drafted Exclusion Clause : 
A « civil » Response to a « Common » Problem 
with Special Reference to Contracts 
for the Provision of Security Services 
John D. CROTHERS* 
Devant la reconnaissance judiciaire accrue des clauses d'exonération 
clairement rédigées, il est devenu pratiquement impossible d'écarter lapplication 
de telles clauses aux litiges en responsabilité. L'auteur affirme que le monde 
commercial a besoin de ces clauses, mais souligne qu'il faut également protéger 
la bonne foi entre les co-contractants afin d'assurer des normes minimales de 
rendement dans l'exécution des contrats. A cet égard, l'auteur pose le problème 
suivant: supposons que le demandeur engage une compagnie de sécurité pour 
protéger son usine contre les risques de vol et de feu. Une clause d'exonération 
parfaitement rédigée protège la défenderesse, la compagnie de sécurité, contre 
la responsabilité qu'elle pourrait encourir par sa négligence ou celle de ses 
préposés dans la garde des lieux. Un gardien de sécurité met feu intentionnel-
lement à l'usine. Est-ce que la compagnie de sécurité est protégée par la clause ? 
Selon la jurisprudence des provinces canadiennes de common law et celle 
d'Angleterre, la réponse est affirmative, l'arrêt de principe (Thoto Productions 
v. Securicor,) est étudié à cet égard. Au Québec, selon l'auteur, la réponse serait 
négative : la responsabilité de la compagnie de sécurité serait engagée. 
L'auteur prétend que cette différence substantielle s'explique par l'histoire 
et les conceptions théoriques de base qui ont donné lieu aux deux systèmes de 
droit. L'auteur examine la division retrouvée en common law entre le droit 
délictuel (tort,) et contractuel (contract,) par rapport à l'unité théorique de 
« responsabilité civile » du droit civil québécois. Il constate ensuite que les 
clauses d'exonération ont été facilement acceptées dans le droit des « contracts » 
de la common law mais qu'elles ont été jugées sévèrement en droit civil 
québécois en utilisant la notion de bonnes mœurs et d'ordre public. 
* B.A., LL.B. B.C.L. (McGill), MacDonald Travelling Scholar (1985), Université de 
Strasbourg III, France. The author would like to thank Professor P. Haanappel of McGill 
University for his comments and Clark, Woods avocats for technical and moral support. 
Of course, the opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the author alone. 
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Malgré les différences entre la common law et le droit civil québécois, les 
deux systèmes reconnaissent aujourd'hui les clauses de non-responsabilité. 
L'auteur soumet, cependant, que le droit civil québécois offre la meilleure 
réponse au problème exprimé ci-haut. Selon lui, lorsque l'exécution négligente 
d'une obligation contractuelle équivaut à un manque de bonne foi, elle doit 
donner lieu à la responsabilité civile malgré la clause d'exonération, vu la 
notion de «faute lourde» développée par la jurisprudence québécoise. Cette 
notion est comparée favorablement aux notions de fundamental breach de la 
common law et celle de l'obligation essentielle du droit civil. 
Après avoir examiné et discuté de la notion de «faute lourde» en étudiant 
les arrêts québécois avec référence particulière aux contrats de sécurité/ 
surveillance, l'auteur termine son étude en proposant que la common law a 
besoin de ce genre d'analyse pour redresser le problème des clauses de non-
responsabilité parfaitement rédigées en évoluant vers une théorie générale des 
obligations et de la responsabilité civile. 
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Introduction 
Born in the industrial revolution of nineteenth century England, the 
exclusion clause was hailed as the epitome of rational risk allocation in 
contracts. Its reception was less warm in the civil law of Quebec. A non-
codal creature which purported to exclude liability, it was judicially perceived 
as contrary to public order. Ultimately, however, a combination of commer-
cial expansion and judicial sleight of hand through obiter of the Supreme 
Court and Privy Council resulted in the grafting of exclusion clauses on to 
Quebec civil law. 
Although essentially foreign to Quebec law, such clauses were quickly 
incorporated into our theory and practice. They remain enigmatic, however, 
and serve to emphasize several basic doctrinal debates in our law : public 
order v. the sanctity of contract, judicial intervention v. "contrat fait la loi", 
option/cumul v. "la thèse du respect du régime contractuel", the theoretical 
unity of civil responsibility v. the duality of contract and delict. 
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The exclusion clause has come of age in the 1980's. In both the common 
and civil law, these clauses can be found in most standard form contracts. 
Drafting of exclusion clauses has also improved, so much so that in the 
world of commercial contracts, judicial devices such as construction or 
adequate notice are no match for a well drafted clause. 
It is submitted that the maturity of exclusion clauses is nowhere better 
evidenced than in contracts for the provision of security services. Indeed, the 
leading English and Quebec cases on exclusion clauses deal with these types 
of contracts. Although this article will focus on an analysis of such a specific 
type of contract, it is submitted that this detailed analysis also sheds light 
upon the general common law and civil law approaches to the ubiquitous 
exclusion clause. 
Security companies are hired to guard against theft and fire, yet their 
standard form contracts inevitably exempt or limit liability for these very 
risks. Such a state of affairs may appear strange to the layman. Judging by 
the case law dealing with plaintiffs trying to avoid such clauses, the co-
contractants in these contracts are often not satisfied when an exclusion 
clause is invoked. While it is true that security companies are not insurers, 
the expectations of the plaintiff must also be examined. He has "bargained" 
for the provision of services and at least would expect good faith performance. 
It is precisely at the point of good faith in contracting that the common 
and civil law diverge. This paper will examine, from a comparative viewpoint, 
the history, theory and application of the respective approaches to the 
following problem : Plaintiff factory owner hires defendant security company 
to guard its premises against the risks of theft and fire. A well drafted 
exemption clause in the standard form contract excludes liability for acts of 
the the defendant's employees in carrying out these duties. The employee 
deliberately sets a fire and the factory is totally destroyed. At common law 
the security company would be protected by the exclusion. It is submitted 
that in the civil law of Quebec liability would ensue. 
1. The Common Law Approach 
1.1. Tort v. Contract : Theory and History 
Professor Bridge, in his article "The Overlap of Tort and Contract" ' 
speaks of the "theoretical duality and technical unity" of the common law 
system of civil liability, in contrast to Professor Crepeau's assertion of the 
theoretical unity and technical duality of regimes of responsibility in Quebec. 
1. (mi)21 McGUILJ. 872, p. 873. 
Faute lourde and Exclusion Clause 885 
At common law, where practice and the incremental growth of the law 
through accretion take precedence over theory and codification — lawyers 
tend to think in terms of the separation of contract and tort. As Bridge 
recognizes : "[TJheoretical unity is wholly absent..." 2. Although Bridge goes 
on in an attempt to advance his thesis that in practice the hermetically-sealed 
compartments separating tort from contract are breaking down, he must 
reluctantly recognize that the leading Supreme Court of Canada case on 
security contracts and the use of exclusion clauses bluntly perpetuates the 
distinction3. 
Surprisingly enough, the historical antecedents of the tort/contract 
separation at common law point to their initial fusion in the writ system of 
forms of action. The source of modern contract law can be traced to the writ 
of trespass, which originally formed part of the law of tort4. By the early 
14th century, an action would lie for breach of an express undertaking by a 
negligent act or commission. 
The common law of contract diverged from tort at this point, however, 
focussing attention on the undertaking as opposed to the injury. Plaintiffs 
began to allege the failure to perform the undertaking as promised rather 
than liability for a misfeasance. Coterminous with the practicalities of 
pleading, an independent contractual vocabulary began to develop based on 
concepts of mutual promises by co-contractors, consideration and unique 
remedies for breach. 
By the turn of the 19th century when the writ system was finally 
abolished, the boundary between tort and contract had become even more 
distinct. Common law theorists began to rationalize and systematize a 
separate area of rules under the rubric of "contract law". 
The end result of the separate evolution of contract and tort is evident 
today. Common law courts tend to perpetuate the distinction between the 
"law of tort" and the "law of contract", especially in commercial situations. 
Where the parties have set out their rights and obligations in a contract, 
liability in an extra-contractual setting will not be lightly imputed. 
2. Id. 
3. J. Nunes Diamonds v. Dominion Electric, [1972] S.C.R. 769. For another examination of the 
problems created by Nunes Diamonds and its perpetuation of the tort/contract distinction 
see B. REITER, "Contracts, Torts, Relations and Reliance", dans REITER et SWAN, Studies 
in Contract Law, Toronto, Butterworths, 1980. 
4. BRIDGE, supra, note 1, p. 874. 
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1.2. Application of the Tort/Contract Distinction in Security Contracts : 
Nunes Diamonds 
The apex of the isolation of contract and tort as separate systems of civil 
liability can be observed within the context of a modern Supreme Court 
judgment dealing with a contract for the provision of security services. In 
/. Nunes Diamonds v. Dominion Electric5, a "civilian" Justice delivered the 
majority opinion and refused to recognize an attempt to overlap tortious and 
contractual regimes. Pigeon J. denied a plaintiffs claim in tort for damages 
that arose while the parties were governed by contractual obligations. 
1.2.1. The Facts 
The facts of Nunes Diamonds are well known : 
The appellant diamond merchant had a contract with respondent, 
under which the latter supplied burglary protection for the appellant's 
premises. The contract limited the respondent's liability for breach of 
contract to $50. The contract also provided : 
16. No conditions, warranties or representations have been made by Dominion 
Company, its officers, servants or agents other than those endorsed hereon in 
writing. 
The premises of another diamond merchant were broken into and a 
large quantity of diamonds stolen. These premises were also protected by the 
defendant's system but the alarm had not gone off. The appellant became 
worried that his premises were not burglar-proof and asked someone from 
the respondent to inspect his system. He was assured that "even our own 
engineers could not go through this system without setting an alarm." The 
respondent also sent to the appellant copies of letters stating that the system 
installed at the other jewellers had performed its job properly, and that 
efforts were still being made to solve the burglary. Of course the appellant's 
premises were broken into by thieves who circumvented the alarm system, 
and a large quantity of diamonds was stolen. 
A subrogated action was brought by the appellant's insurers for 
damages equal to the total value of the loss (which far exceeded $50). 
1.2.2. The Majority Decision 
In what can only be seen as an attempt to defend the "purity" of the 
tort/contract distinction, Pigeon J. would not allow recovery in tort for the 
5. Supra, note 3. 
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post-contractual assurances of the security company. The appellant had 
attempted to characterize these assurances as negligent misstatements as to 
the quality of the alarm system upon which it relied to its detriment. 
Stressing that the contract alone governed relations between the parties, 
Pigeon J. went on to conclude : 
It is a case in which, the parties having mutually established their respective 
rights and obligations by contract, it is sought to impose upon one of them a 
much greater obligation than that fixed by the contract by reason of an alleged 
misrepresentation as to the infallibility of the system which it provides. [...] To 
make the protection company liable, in the case of the failure of its protection 
system, not for the stipulated nominal damages ($50) but for the full value of 
the goods to be protected, is a fundamental alteration of the contract. 
In my view, the representations relied on by appellant cannot be considered as 
acts independent of the contractual relationship between the parties. This can 
be readily verified by asking the question : Would these representations have 
been made if the parties had not been in the contractual relationship in which 
they stood ? Therefore, the question of liability arising out of those representa-
tions should not be approached as if the parties had been strangers, but on the 
basis of the contract between them. Hence the question should be : May this 
contract of service be considered as having been turned into the equivalent of a 
contract of insurance, by virtue of inaccurate or incomplete representations 
respecting the actual value of the protection service supplied ? In my view, there 
is no doubt that this question should be answered in the negative.6 
1.2.3. The Dissent 
It is interesting to note that Spence J., in his dissenting judgment 
suggested an alternative approach which goes against the independence of 
tort and contract. His opinion also purported to deal with the specific 
problem of how exclusion clauses fit into a regime which might allow injured 
plaintiffs to sue in contract or tort. Rather than automatically excluding a 
cause of action in tort merely because of contractual relations between the 
parties, Spence J. took a "civilian" approach7. After recognizing that the 
relationship between the parties was to some extent defined by the contract, 
he also pointed out that this relationship could give rise to a concomitant 
duty to take care not to injure the plaintiff. The question thus becomes not 
whether the existence of a contract wipes out tortious responsibility, but 
whether the particular contract had in fact excluded liability in tort as well as 
contract. 
Spence J. went on to state that liability in negligence as well as contract 
may be excluded by a validly worded exemption clause, but that attempts to 
6. Id., p. 777-778. 
7. For an outline of the "civilian" approach, see Part II, below. 
888 Les Cahiers de Droit (1985) 26 c. de D. 881 
exclude negligence would be strictly interpreted. By examining clause 16 of 
the contract, which stated that no representations "have" been made, in light 
of a strict interpretation test, Spence J. was able to avoid the exclusion clause 
and allow recovery : 
[I] have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that clause 16 of the 
agreement between the appellant and the respondent cannot operate as a bar to 
a claim based on a tortious misrepresentation made many months after the 
contract which contained such clause had been executed.8 
1.3. Conclusion 
The practical effect of Nunes Diamonds, whatever its critiques9, is that it 
will be difficult for a plaintiff in a contract for the provision of security 
services to rely on non-contractual remedies. Read at its widest, the case 
stands for the proposition that contractual relations will take precedence 
over tortious liability incurred within the contractual context. Even on the 
more narrow alternative reading, it could be said that as well drafted, an 
exclusion clause could have covered the tort in question. 
The following section of this essay will thus examine possible contractual 
remedies open to common law plaintiff for the breach of a security 
agreement. 
1.4. The Rise of Exclusion Clauses 
1.4.1. History and Economic Theory 
The rise of contract and contract law in early 19th century England can 
be traced to the demands of the industrial revolution. In an atmosphere of 
laissez-faire, contracts were used to maximize efficiency and reduce risk 
between businessmen intent upon turning a profit throught the exchange of 
resources l0. 
While the technology of mass production was turning out standardized 
manufactured goods, another byproduct was standardized contracts. Rather 
than negotiating with every party in a classical bargaining environment to 
produce individual contracts for every need of a large scale business 
enterprise — standard forms were widely used for standard repetitive 
transactions. 
8. Supra, note 3, p. 810. 
9. BRIDGE, supra, note 1, finds that it goes against his theory on the overlap of tort and 
contract. 
10. See YATES, Exclusion Clauses in Contracts, (1982) 1-26. 
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The economics of producing standard forms for standard situations 
also dictated that standard risks inherent in the performance of a contract be 
identified and allocated. Good business sense suggested that the party 
putting forward the contract attempt to ensure that terms, which were by 
definition not open to negotiation, were favourable to that party. The 
success of this approach was of course conditioned by the degree of 
competition in the industry and the relative bargaining strength of the 
parties. 
One of the key risks of any contract is that of liability for breach of a 
contractual obligation. Standard forms thus contained clauses which 
attempted to define precisely the obligations being undertaken by the 
stipulating party or alternately to transfer or limit the liability flowing from 
the breach of these obligations. Such contractual risk-shifting devices 
became known as exclusion, exemption or limitation clauses. 
1.4.2. Doctrinal Analysis 
From the laissez-faire era up to the present day, the common law has 
tolerated exclusion clauses in a commercial context as an application of the 
freedom of contract doctrine. Judges remain reluctant to interfere with the 
allocation of risk between commercial co-contractors. Unlike consumer 
situations, where negative aspects of standard forms such as the essentially 
"take it or leave it" thrust of the contract and the potential for abuse of 
superior bargaining power, are often taken into account, well drafted 
exclusion clauses in commercial contracts will not usually be tampered with. 
Nor has the existence of exclusion clauses at common law been seriously 
questioned by scholars. 
The theoretical purpose of such clauses, economically based allocation 
of risk, has traditionally been recognized by theorists " and the courts 12. The 
theoretical nature of the exclusion clause, on the other hand, has been 
examined by few authors. The major common law analyst of exclusion 
clauses, Coote 13, has suggested an approach that keeps squarely within the 
contractual setting. He differentiates between the procedural and substantive 
theories. The traditional view is characterized as a "procedural approach" 14. 
In other words, an exception clause provides a shield to a claim for damages 
while the only relevance of the obligations undertaken by the promisor is 
that they have been breached. As Coote summarizes : 
11. Id. 
12. Nunes Diamonds, supra, note 3. 
13. Exception Clauses, (1964). 
14. Id, p. 2. 
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On this approach it is the duty of the courts, when confronted with a contract 
containing exception clauses, to look at the contract apart from the exempting 
clauses and see what are the terms express or implied which impose an 
obligation on the promisor. The exempting clauses will then operate, if at all, 
only as a defence to breaches of the obligation thus determined." 
An alternative analysis is the "substantive approach" 16, which ignores the 
promisee's "procedural" rights of enforcement of the contract and concen-
trates on the promises themselves. A valid contractual promise can be seen as 
creating a substantive primary right to performance of the promise and a 
correlative duty on the promissor to perform. A secondary substantive 
obligation to pay pecuniary compensation for breach of these promises also 
comes into being. Applying this approach to exclusion clauses, Coote states : 
In the first place, the function of all exception clauses, being substantive, is to 
place substantive limitations upon the rights to which they apply, and, 
accordingly, to help delimit and define those rights. In the second place, an 
exception clause which made purported contractual rights wholly unenforceable 
would not have effect merely as a shield to claims for damages. It would, in 
fact, prevent those rights from accruing in the first place. Suppose, for 
example, that I sell a horse which I say is sound for jumping, but provide in the 
written agreement that I accept no responsibility whatever if the horse should 
prove unsound. What I am doing is to ensure that the purchaser has no 
primary contractual right to call for a horse which is sound for jumping. I am 
not contracting that the horse is sound and giving myself a shield in case of 
breach. I am simply refusing to contract on the point at all ." 
1.5. Application of History and Theory to Security Contracts : 
Photo Productions 
Despite the economic rational and judicial acceptance of exclusion 
clauses or Coote's contention that there may not have been any promise 
made at all, plaintiffs unhappy with a total exemption or limitation of 
liability have attempted to qualify or avoid such clauses. Perhaps many 
businessmen might not consider themselves to be the laissez-faire bargainers 
or rationally allocating risk-takers that the common law courts most often 
see them to be. 
1.5.1. The Facts 
Again, a case involving the provision of security services provides us 
with an illustrative example. In Photo Productions v. Securicor 18 the plaintiff 
15. Id.,p. 1. 
16. Id., p. 2. 
17. Id., p. 7. 
18. [1980] A.C. 827. 
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contracted with the defendants for the provision of a night patrol service for 
their greeting card factory. The main perils which the parties had in mind 
were fire and theft. The contract, on the defendants' printed form, incor-
porated standard conditions which provided : 
1. Under no circumstances shall the company be responsible for any injurious 
act or default by any employee of the company unless such act or default could 
have been foreseen and avoided by the exercise of due diligence on the part of 
the company as his employer; nor, in any event, shall the company be held 
responsible for : (a) any loss suffered by the customer through [...] fire or any 
other cause, except insofar as such loss is solely attributable to the negligence 
of the company's employees acting within the course of their employment...183 
One of the defendants' employees entered the factory on patrol and lit a 
fire which burned down the factory. The employee, who had satisfactory 
references and had been employed by the defendants for some three months, 
later said that he had only meant to start a small fire but that it had got out 
of control. 
The employee was subsequently convicted of maliciously damaging a 
building and sentenced to three years imprisonment. The plaintiff claimed 
substantial damages based on breach of contract, while the defendant used 
the exclusion clause to deny any liability. 
In an effort to avoid the application of the exclusion clause, the plaintiff 
developed an argument based on the common law concept of "fundamental 
breach". After underlining the nature and purpose of the contract as the 
provision of a security service to safeguard its factory against theft and fire, 
the plaintiff identified as a "fundamental term" of the contract that while the 
security personnel were on the premises to discharge their contractual 
obligation they would not do any deliberate act calculated to damage 
customer's property. In other words : 
The act of setting fire to the customer's property is to be properly described as 
a total breach of contract..." 
18". Id.,-p. 830. 
19. Id., p. 835. In arguing "fundamental breach", the plaintiff was attempting to invoke a line 
of common law cases wherein concepts of "consumer protection" had begun to blur more 
traditional contractual analyses. Plaintiffs who wished to claim damages, could not as a 
result of the contractual context claim a remedy for breach of a duty of care. Nor, on the 
other hand, did they wish merely to repudiate the contract and claim return of monies 
paid. Rather, plaintiffs wished full compensation for serious consequences ensuing from 
deficient performance of the contract — despite clear protection of the defendant by an 
exclusion clause. Certain judges were prepared to grant this. 
Denning L.J. (as he then was) extended the concept of "fundamental breach" from its 
initial creation in Maritime charterparty cases [Hain Steamship v. Tale, (1936) 41 Comm C. 
350 ; Chandris v. Isbrandsen-Moller, [1951] 1 K.B. 240] into the general area of commercial 
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Such a wilful breach of the contract, the argument concluded, results as 
a rule of law in the repudiation of the contract and with it the exclusion 
clauses. Since the contract no longer exists, the exclusions no longer apply 
and the plaintiff would be entitled to compensation for the total damages 
suffered. 
1.5.2. The Majority Decision 
Lord Wilberforce, with whom three of the five law Lords concurred, did 
not accept the plaintiffs argument. In an implicit application of the 
"procedural" or "shield" approach to exclusion clauses he began by 
dismissing the contention that "fundamental breach" was a rule of law 
under which courts could eliminate exclusion clauses along with the 
contract. Rather, it was merely a question of construction looking at the 
contract as a whole, as to whether the exclusion clause covered the particular 
breach. Even if the exclusion did not cover the breach in question he 
continued, the contract survives and the parties are only excused from future 
performance. Damages must be claimed under the contractual limitations. 
Finally, it was held that a carefully drafted clause may exclude liability for 
both contractual breach (failing to ensure the safety and security of the 
premises which burned down) and tort (vicarious liability for negligent or 
deliberate acts of servants burning down the premises). 
Applying these rules to the facts, his Lordship was able to construe the 
clause as clearly exempting the security company from responsibility for the 
damages suffered : 
In these circumstances nobody could consider it unreasonable, that as between 
these two equal parties the risk assumed by Securicor should be a modest one, 
and that the respondents should carry the substantial risk of damage or 
destruction.20 
contracts and consumer protection. While in the case of Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v. Wallis, 
[1956] 1 W.L.R. 936, his brother Law Lords were developing an analysis which resembled 
the civilian "obligation essentielle" (infra, 2.4.4.2.) wherein an exclusion clause could be 
read out when the proferens could not be said to have performed his contract at all. Lord 
Denning was examining breaches going "to the root of the contract." As extended in 
Charterhouse Credit v. Tolly, [1963] 2 Q.B. 683, courts of first instance began to use this 
doctrine as a rule of substantive law, whereunder an exclusion clause, no matter how well 
drafted, could not be used to avoid liability where "fundamental breach" was found. [For 
an excellent analysis of the development of this doctrine, see YATES, supra, note 10, 
p. 219-236]. 
20. Id., p. 846. 
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1.5.3. An Alternative Approach : Lord Diplock 
Lord Diplock agreed with the majority view that fundamental breach 
was a rule of construction which did not extinguish the contract. He also 
concluded that the exclusion clause as drafted exempted the security firm 
from liability. The judgment is notable, however, for the substantive 
approach used by his Lordship to explain the nature of the common law 
contract and the purpose of exclusion clauses. 
He began by recognizing the basic commonsense of the factory owner's 
arguments as set out above : 
It is not disputed that the act of Securicor's servant, Musgrove, in starting a fire 
in the factory which they had undertaken to protect was a breach of contract 
by Securicor; and since it was the cause of an event, the destruction of the 
factory, that rendered further performance of the contract impossible it is not 
an unnatural use of ordinary language to descrite it as a "fundamental 
breach".21 
To explain why Securicor was not liable for the breach, however, 
required an examination of Coote's theory of primary and secondary 
obligations : 
My Lords, it is characteristic of commercial contracts, nearly all of which 
today are entered into not by natural legal persons, but by fictitious ones, i.e., 
companies, that the parties promise to one another that some thing will be 
done; for instance, [...] that services of a particular kind will be provided. Such 
a contract is the source of primary legal obligations upon each party to it to 
procure that whatever he has promised will be done is done.22 [...] 
Every failure to perform a primary obligation is a breach of contract. The 
secondary obligation on the part of the contract breaker to which it gives rise 
by implication of the common law is to pay monetary compensation to the 
other party for the loss sustained by him in consequence of the breach...23 
Recognizing the principle of freedom of contract, Lord Diplock con-
tinued by stating that parties were free to agree for themselves whether 
primary and secondary obligations were to be incorporated modified or 
rejected. A fundamental breach can thus be defined using this analysis : 
Where the event resulting from the failure by one party to perform a primary 
obligation has the effect of depriving the other party of substantially the whole 
benefit which it was the intention of the parties that he should obtain from the 
contract, the party not in default may elect to put an end to all primary 
obligations of both parties remaining unperformed. (If the expression "funda-
mental breach" is to be retained, it should, in the interests of clarity, be 
confined to this exception.) [...] 
21. Id, p. 846-847. 
22. Id., p. 848. 
23. Id., p. 849. 
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Where such an election is made (a) there is substituted by implication of law 
for the primary obligations of the party in default which remain unperformed a 
secondary obligation to pay monetary compensation to the other party for the 
loss sustained by him in consequence of their non-performance in the future 
and (b) the unperformed primary obligations of that other party are discharged. 
This secondary obligation is additional to the general secondary obligations ; I 
will call it "the anticipatory secondary obligation".24 
Even in cases of fundamental breach, however, the secondary obligations 
of paying damages and/or electing to put the contract to an end may be 
excluded or modified by express words. The above analysis, based solely on 
contract law has the advantage of not having to resort to a tort and contract 
analysis of the exclusion clause, as Lord Wilberforce had done. Rather, 
where the primary obligation is the provision of a service by the security 
company : 
... performance of the promise necessitates procuring a natural person to do it; 
but the legal relationship between the promisor and the natural person by 
whom the act is done, whether it is that of master and servant, or principal and 
agent, or of parties to an independent sub-contract, is generally irrelevant. If 
that person fails to do it in the manner in which the promisor has promised to 
procure it to be done, as, for instance, with reasonable skill and care, the 
promisor has failed to fulfil his own primary obligation. This is to be 
distinguished from "vicarious liability" — a legal concept which does depend 
upon the existence of a particular legal relationship between the natural person 
by whom a tortious act was done and the person sought to be made vicariously 
liable for it. In the interests of clarity the expression should, in my view, be 
confined to liability for tort.25 
Applying his analysis to the facts before him, his Lordship concluded : 
... in the absence of the exclusion clause [...] a primary obligation of Securicor 
under the contract, which would be implied by law, would be an absolute 
obligation to procure that the visits by the night patrol to the factory were 
conducted by natural persons who would exercise reasonable skill and care for 
the safety of the factory. That primary obligation is modified by the exclusion 
clause. Securicor's obligation to do this is not to be absolute, but is limited to 
exercising due diligence in its capacity as employer of the natural persons by 
whom the visits are conducted to procure that those persons shall exercise 
reasonable skill and care for the safety of the factory.26 
Since Securicor was not in breach of this modified primary obligation 
having received good references before hiring the employee, no liability 
could be claimed. 
24. Id. 
25. Id., p. 848. 
26. Id, p. 851. 
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1.6. Limitation Clauses 
After upholding the exclusion clause in a "fundamental breach" 
situation in Photoproductions, the House of Lords further pronounced upon 
the sanctity of limited liability clauses in security contracts in the case of 
Ailsa Craig Fishing v. Malvern Fishing11. The same defendant, Securicor, was 
involved. 
In this case the hapless security guard hired to patrol the harbour on 
New Year's Eve went off for a drink and allowed a boat to be wrecked by the 
rising tide, the risk he was hired to prevent. The defendant admitted fault, 
and that the vessel was a total loss. The Court found a total failure to 
perform the contract. Nevertheless the defendant relied on a limitation of 
liability clause in their contract : 
If, pursuant to the provisions set out herein, any liability on the part of the 
Company shall arise (whether under the express or implied terms of this 
Contract, or at Common Law, or in any other way) to the customer for any 
loss or damage of whatever nature arising out of or connected with the 
provision of, or purported provision of, or failure in provision of, the services 
covered by this Contract, such liability shall be limited to the payment by the 
Company by way of damages of a sum [...] not exceeding £1,000.28 
The Court upheld the clause, finding it "perfectly clear" since 
The relevant words must be given, if possible, their natural, plain meaning. 
Clauses of limitation are not regarded by the courts with the same hostility as 
clauses of exclusion ; this is because they must be related to other contractual 
terms, in particular to the risks to which the defending party may be exposed, 
the remuneration which he receives and possibly also the opportunity of the 
other party to insure.29 
1.7. Conclusions 
The results of both analyses of the Photo Productions court and Ailsa 
Craig is that under common law, the principle of freedom of contract has 
tr iumphed over the use of "fundamental breach" to modify the potential for 
harsh application of exclusion clauses. 
Based on Lord Wilberforce's approach, an exclusion clause if properly 
drafted can exclude liability in tort and contract, for acts that are negligent 
or deliberate, even though the consequences of such acts may go to the heart 
of the bargain in the eyes of the plaintiff. 
27. [1983] 1 All E.R. 101. 
28. Id., p. 103. 
29. Id, p. 102-103. 
896 Les Cahiers de Droit (1985) 26 C. de D. 881 
Using Lord Diplock, an absolute contractual duty to use reasonable 
efforts and keep the guarded premises safe from fire or theft may be 
modified through clear words. An apparent breach of the fundamental 
obligation to safeguard thus becomes no breach at all, since the security 
company has not promised that the watchman will in fact watch the factory, 
nor that its watchmen will not decide to do the exact deeds they were hired to 
prevent. Rather, the security company has only contracted to use reasonable 
care in the selection of its employees. Such an agreement still retains the 
characteristics of a contract, so the courts will enforce it. 
After the Ailsa Craig decision, limitation clauses in security service 
contracts are to be given an even more peremptory scrutiny by judges. 
Courts recognize the principle that in the presence of clear words, limited 
liability represents a valid allocation of risk with the limited damages being 
proportional to the sums paid for the service rather than the possible losses 
that may result. 
The security contract cases, J. Nunes Diamonds, Photo Productions, and 
the Ailsa Craig clearly reveal the philosophical underpinnings and historical 
evolution of the common law. Based on commercial ideals of laissez-faire, 
freedom of contract and allocation of risk, common law courts give effect to 
"clear words" in standard form contracts that exclude or limit liability. 
Tortious liability can at best be ignored or at least contracted out of. 
The theme of commercial risk allocation allows the enforcement of 
clauses which would seem to belie the basic purposes of the contract entered 
into. An alarm that does nothing when represented as foolproof, a guard 
that does not guard, or a guard that deliberately causes the damages he was 
hired to prevent — all are protected. Plaintiffs are denied the option of suing 
in tort to escape the exclusion, or if a distinction is made between tortious 
damages and breach of contract, the clause can exclude both. Attempts to 
characterize the breach as "fundamental" either in terms of the gravity of 
damage or the denial of the basic purpose of contracting will not be needed. 
At common law a properly worded clause is sacrosanct. 
2. The Civil Law Approach 
2.1. The Exclusion Clause: Theory and History 
Although a codified system, the Civil Code of Lower Canada does not 
deal specifically with exemption clauses. Due to this lacuna in the Code, and 
especially the potential conflict with existing codai provisions — the 
evolution of Quebec jurisprudence on such clauses has been a slow and 
painful process. 
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Two major theoretical debates contributed to the slow development of a 
satisfactory response to exemption clauses in Quebec, both of which were 
overcome early in the common law : the problem of "public order and good 
morals", and the problem of "la zone d'influence de chacun des deux régimes 
de responsabilité civile"30. 
2.1.1. Public Order and Good Morals 
By art. 13 C.C. : 
"On ne peut déroger par des conventions particulières aux lois qui intéressent 
l'ordre public ou les bonnes moeurs." 
In keeping with the minimalist wording of the Civil Code, the terms 
"public order and good morals" are nowhere specifically defined. The 
practical result, as Mignault31 points out, is that the wisdom of our judges 
define these vague terms. Thus, civilian judges have never hesitated in 
rejecting exclusion clauses in circumstances of personal or bodily injury to 
the plaintiff. There has always existed as well the potential for judicial 
interference in "private agreements" which attempt to exclude or limit 
liability for damage to goods. The latter approach must be contrasted to that 
of the common law, as set out above, where judges gave full support to the 
themes of freedom of contract, sanctity of the bargain and risk allocation, 
thus refusing to intervene in commercial contracts. 
Professor Crépeau is forced to qualify his sweeping statements on 
freedom of contract in Quebec in recognition of this potential for judicial 
interference : 
Le droit contractuel repose, en droit civil canadien, sur le principe de 
l'autonomie de la volonté dans le respect de l'ordre public et des bonnes mœurs. 
Le contrat valablement formé fait la loi des parties. C'est donc dire que, dans la 
mesure où elles respectent l'ordre public, les parties ont la possibilité de 
librement façonner leurs relations contractuelles au mieux de leurs intérêts.32 
(my emphasis) 
Since by definition the Quebec system allows only a limited freedom of 
contract due to art. 13 C.C, it is not surprising that exclusion clauses, which 
could be characterized as attempts to exclude liability to compensate for 
damages, did not initially thrive under judicial scrutiny. It is respectfully 
submitted that Prof. Crépeau was historically inaccurate when he attempted 
30. CRÉPEAU, "Des Régimes contractuels et délictuels de responsabilité civile en droit civil 
canadien", (1962)/?. du B. 503. 
31. Droit civil canadien, t. 1, Montréal, C. Théoret, 1895, p. 121. 
32. CRÉPEAU, supra, note 30, 552. 
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to use the example of exclusion clauses to support his "contrat fait la loi" 
theory : 
Les parties peuvent aussi s'exonérer, par une clause expresse, de toutes les 
conséquences juridiques qui découleraient de l'inexécution non intentionnelle 
des obligations découlant du contrat. Ce droit est définitivement consacré par la 
jurisprudence qui, depuis le début du siècle, affirme que de telles clauses 
d'exonération de responsabilité ne sont pas contraires à l'ordre public.33 
(my emphasis) 
In reality, it was only ten years prior to the writing of Crépeau's article, 
in other words the middle of the twentieth century, before exemption clauses 
gained unqualified judicial recognition. 
2.1.2. Glengoil v. Pilkington 
The turn of the century jurisprudence in favor of the validity of 
exclusion clauses referred to by Crépeau, was in fact limited to an obiter 
dictum in the case of Glengoil Steamship v. Pilkington u . In Glengoil a bill of 
lading for carriage of glass by sea purported to exclude liability for breakage 
due to "negligence, rough handling or any other cause whatsoever" 35. 
Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal held that such a clause was 
contrary to public order. The Supreme Court based its decision on the 
finding that damage was caused by improper stowage, a fault not excluded 
by the clause in question. It was only in obiter that Taschereau J. commented 
on exclusion clauses, in a manner that cannot be described as either a ringing 
endorsement or particularly faithful to Quebec antecedents : 
The learned judge who, for the court, gave the reasons for the judgment, holds 
that the stipulation in question is illegal, because it is immoral and contrary to 
public interest. Such, he says, is the uniform jurisprudence in the Province of 
Quebec. Assuming that to be so, [...] for us to blindly follow that jurisprudence 
here, though more pleasant and far less onerous, would be to forget our duties. 
We have to scrutinize and review it, mindful always, I need not say, of the high 
consideration it is entitled to. It strikes one as an astounding proposition, to 
say the least, that what is undoubtedly licit in England, under the British flag, 
which covers over two-thirds of the maritime carrying trade of the world, 
should be immoral and against public order in the Province of Quebec, and 
that what is sanctioned by law in six of the Provinces of this Dominion, should 
be prohibited in the seventh because of its immorality. [...] 
However, as we have come to the conclusion that the appeal fails upon another 
ground, I will not here dwell more at length upon this question, [...]36 
33. Id., p. 553. 
34. (1898)28 R.C.S. 146. 
35. Id., p. 154. 
36. Id., p. 155 a 157. 
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Despite the existence of Glengoil, lower courts in Quebec often continued 
to use public order arguments to avoid exemption clauses well into the 
twentieth century. As one commentator concluded : 
Nous pouvons dire que le principe posé dans l'affaire Glengoil s'est établi avec 
peu d'enthousiasme dans la jurisprudence québécoise.37 
2.1.3. Canada Steamship Lines 
It was not until 1952 that the Privy Council finally ended the controversy 
and concluded that public order and good morals could exist in an era of 
exemption clauses. 
In Canada Steamship Lines v. The King38 the plaintiff, a tenant, sued the 
Crown as landlord over the destruction of the premises in question, a 
Montreal warehouse. Due to the negligent use of a torch by the defendant's 
servants during repairs on the warehouse, fire broke out and destroyed the 
building and contents. The Crown claimed protection behind an exemption 
clause in the lease which provided : 
[TJhat the lessee shall not have any claim or demand against the lessor for [...] 
damage [...] to the said shed [...] or to any [...] goods [...] at any time [...] being 
[...] in the said shed.39 
Ignoring the appellants contention that "citations from the English law 
do not appear to have any direct bearing on the problem", the Privy Council 
proceeded to use a common law approach to solving the issue. Despite the 
ambiguities in the Glengoil case the Court held that the issue of public order 
and good morals had been definitively laid to rest in 1897 : 
(1) If the clause contains language which expressly exempts the person in 
whose favour it is made (hereafter called "the proferens") from the consequence 
of the negligence of his own servants, effect must be given to that provision. 
Any doubts which existed whether this was the law in the Province of Quebec 
were removed by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in The Glengoil 
Steamship Company v. Pilkington,40 
Although fifty years of uncertainty in the Quebec civil law had just been 
clarified, this was still an obiter dictum upholding the obiter in Glengoil since 
the Court went on to hold that Glengoil did not apply on the facts before it. 
Rather, a common law construction test was used, based on the codified 
contra proferentum rule of art. 1019 C.C. read with Alderslade v. Hendon 
Laundry*0* under which a proferens who does not exclude liability for 
37. SARNA, Traité de la clause de non-responsabilité, Toronto, De Boo, 1975, p. 74. 
38. [1952] A.C. 192. 
39. Id., p. 203. 
40. M , p. 208. 
40a. [1945] 1 All E.R. 244. 
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negligence, will be bound if the clause could be read as reasonably excluding 
other heads of damage. 
As if to underline the essentially common law ratio of the case, the Privy 
Council concluded by analysing the bargain between the parties on a risk 
allocation model, nowhere canvassed in the lower court decisions : 
It is difficult to imagine the Crown saying to the company, when the lease was 
being negotiated : "Notwithstanding that the Crown agrees to maintain the 
shed, at its own expense, throughout the term of the lease, and notwithstanding 
that such an agreement implies an obligation to use due care in its performance, 
if the Crown's servants set about the work of repair in such a negligent manner 
that the shed and all the goods therein are destroyed, you are to have no claim 
for damages against the Crown", and if the Crown had made such a 
suggestion, it seems unlikely that the company would have accepted it.41 
2.1.4. Conclusion 
The result of Glengoil as rehabilitated by Canada Steamship, is that 
"public order and good morals" cannot be used as a bar to exclusion of 
liability for mere negligence of employees. Far from being a satisfactory 
examination of the antecedent jurisprudence and doctrine in Quebec, this 
tacit recognition of exclusion clauses in Canada Steamship was the result of 
an obiter upon an obiter, both emulating the common law response which 
shared neither a theoretical unity or common history. 
2.2. The Boundaries of Contract and Delict : Theory and History 
2.2.1. Unity of Regimes 
While it took the civil law of Quebec until the mid-twentieth century to 
"clarify" the relationship between public order and exclusion clauses, it was 
not until 1981 that the second major theoretical problem that touched upon 
such clauses was decided. The boundaries of contract and delict in a system 
which stresses the unity of regimes of civil responsibility required extended 
judicial and doctrinal soul searching. 
As outlined above, the common law is based upon the theoretical 
duality of the contract and tort regimes. The civil law of Quebec, on the 
contrary, is based upon the theoretical unity of contract and delict. Referring 
again to the seminal work of Crépeau : 
On s'accorde à reconnaître que la responsabilité civile repose essentiellement 
sur la violation d'une obligation juridique, qu'il s'agisse d'un devoir contractuel 
ou d'une prescription légale.42 
41. Supra, note 38, p. 210. 
42. Supra, note 30, p. 503. 
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Although Crépeau goes on to argue for the de facto duality of regimes, 
his thesis is again weakened in reference to exclusion clauses. He must 
recognize that the area of exclusion clauses amounts merely to a "différence 
contestable entre les régimes de responsabilité"43 . 
At the theoretical level, exclusion clauses in Quebec must also be 
contrasted to the French approach. In France, as Mazeaud points out, the 
duality of regimes is evident : 
La jurisprudence distingue, quant à la validité de ces conventions, entre la 
responsabilité contractuelle et la responsabilité délictuelle. Tandis qu'elle 
frappe de nullité les conventions qui suppriment ou limitent la responsabilité 
délictuelle, elle pose le principe de la validité des clauses d'exonération totale ou 
partielle d'une responsabilité contractuelle.'4 
Quebec, on the contrary, does not follow the dualist approach of France 
but allows exclusion clauses, with certain limitations, to work in both the 
domains of contract and delict. To quote Crépeau : 
Dans la mesure où une telle clause est valable, elle ne peut avoir qu'un seul 
effet : l'exonération totale du défendeur de toute responsabilité.45 
2.2.2. Option/Cumul 
Since by definition "civil responsibility" covers both contract and 
delict, the regimes are not exclusive and the boundaries often hard to 
distinguish. The result of unclear boundaries has been a doctrinal and 
judicial debate over option and cumul. As defined by Crépeau : 
Le problème de l'option pose la question de savoir si le demandeur, créancier 
d'une obligation contractuelle, peut, à son gré, invoquer le régime contractuel 
ou délaisser ce dernier et invoquer le régime extra-contractuel de responsabilité, 
selon que l'on ou l'autre lui est plus favorable. Il s'agit donc d'un choix par le 
créancier entre l'action contractuelle et l'action extra-contractuelle. Le problème 
du cumul pose, lui, la question de savoir si le demandeur, créancier d'une 
obligation contractuelle, peut intenter une "action hybride", invoquant à la 
fois les deux régimes de responsabilité, mais en puisant dans l'un et l'autre les 
règles qui lui sont davantage favorables. Il s'agit, on le voit, d'une sorte 
d'action contracto-délictuelle [...]46 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Wabasso Ltd. v. National Drying 
Machine47 has chosen to perpetuate the overlap of contract and delict by 
allowing a plaintiff to use option. 
43. Id, p. 513. 
44. H., L. et F. MAZEAUD, Leçons de droit civil, Paris, Éd. Montchrestien, 1962, par. 633. 
45. Supra, note 30, p. 517. 
46. Id, p. 529-530. 
47. [1981] 1 R.C.S. 578. 
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One of the authorities cited by the Court in this case was the Quebec 
security contract case of Alliance Assurance Co. v. Dominion Electric 
Protection™ where Pigeon J., in contrast to his common law judgment in 
J. Nunes Diamonds (supra), was held to have "clearly" expressed the opinion 
that 
... the existence of contractual relations does in no way exclude the possibility 
of a delictual or quasi-delictual obligation arising out of the same fact.49 
2.2.3. Critique of Option 
It is unclear whether Pigeon J.'s statement in Alliance as used in 
Wabasso represents an explicit or intentional distinction on his part between 
the civil law and the common law. Some critics of Wabasso, however, use 
arguments similar to those advanced by Pigeon J. in the Diamonds case. Both 
Crépeau (prior to Wabasso )50 and Jobin51 protest that to allow the plaintiff 
the option to ignore the contract diminishes the importance of the theory 
that the contract "makes the law" between parties : 
... grâce à cette gymnastique intellectuelle, elle "répudie" le contrat. Permettre 
l'option, c'est donc permettre la violation du principe de la force obligatoire du 
contrat.52 
2.2.4. Response 
For the purpose of this paper on the exclusion clause in Quebec, a 
critique of option as destroying respect for the contractual regime cannot be 
supported. The unity of civil responsibility in the Civil Code which has 
resulted in judicial approval of option, to the possible detriment of a 
defendant who wishes to stay within the contract, has also resulted in a 
practical solution to the problem. While the Quebec system of civil 
responsibility recognizes option, it is also up to the contracting parties to 
exclude liability in both delict and contract. 
Thus, in Madill v. Sommer" the Supreme Court came full-circle from 
the effects of Canada Steamship Lines (supra ). In the latter, it will be recalled, 
exclusion clauses were legitimized in obiter, while a construction test was 
being used to ground liability in negligence where the clause was silent. The 
48. [1970] S.C.R. 168. 
49. Id., p. 173. 
50. Supra, note 30, p. 553. 
51. "Wabasso: Un Arrêt Tristement Célèbre", (1982) 27 McGill L.J. 813. 
52. M., p. 829. 
53. [1978] 1 R.CS. 999. 
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Madill court, on the contrary, faced with a lengthy, modern exclusion clause 
which left no grounds for construction — held that a defendant, through the 
use of such a clause may validly exclude liability in both contract and quasi-
delict. Thus, while a Quebec defendant risks delictual liability even within a 
contractual relationship, a well-drafted exoneration clause will prevent this 
option — and preserve respect for the contractual regime governing the 
parties. 
2.2.5. Conclusion 
As the above analysis has shown, the notion of "public order" and the 
threat of option/cumul have not encroached completely into the contractual 
regime to the detriment of a bargain analysis. Not all exclusion clauses are 
against public order, while the use of such clauses actually offsets one of the 
negative effects of option. 
In the common law, where the duality of contract and tort is stressed in 
such decisions as Nunes Diamonds and Photo Productions, no satisfactory 
response is given to the possibility that a tortious or contractual action may 
arise out of the same breach. Ogilvie54 correctly criticizes Photo Productions 
on this point, while Spence J.'s dissent in the Diamond case takes the same 
approach. In practice, however, freedom of contract at common law will 
allow an exemption clause to exclude liability in both regimes. The civil law 
of Quebec, on the contrary is at least internally consistent since its overall 
theory of civil responsibility can recognize both option and exemption. 
2.3. Faute lourde 
2.3.1. Introduction 
The previous sections outlined the duality of the common law with its 
compartmentalized regimes of tort and contract. The exclusion clause, 
although practically situated in contract is allowed to exclude tortious 
liability. Although no theoretical justification is given for this anomaly, it 
would appear to be the result of the laissez-faire/freedom of contract 
analysis which is the true basis of the common law of contract — unfettered 
by judicial interference based on notions of public order. 
The civil law of Quebec, by comparison, remains theoretically unified. 
Previous sections of this Part examined how exclusion clauses can allow 
exemption of liability in both delict and contract through implicit cumul. 
54. "The Reception of Photo Productions in Canada", (1982) 27 McGill L.J. 424, p. 432. 
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Such clauses also belie the "contract as law" arguments of those who favor 
the clear separation of regimes. "Public Order", as a tool for judicial 
intervention in contracts, still remains a possible argument for plaintiffs, 
although only in exceptional circumstances. 
Despite the differences in theory and history between the common and 
civil law approaches to exclusion clauses, both systems have ultimately 
arrived by the 1980's at a common recognition of such clauses. Concomittant 
with the maturity of exclusion clauses, however, comes potential problems. 
Just how much can a clearly drafted clause exclude ? Here, the common law 
and the civil law diverge, with the common law response proving unsatis-
factory to many commentators, judges and legislators. 
After the death of the "heresy" of fundamental breach in Photo 
Productions, a pro-defendant/proferens bias has been created in the common 
law. The protection of a clearly drafted exclusion clause will extend to cover 
any breach in contract or tort falling short of fraud. In the words of one 
common law commentator : 
Standard form contracts and exclusion clauses have come of age. [...] In any 
case, use of the magical words "howsoever", "whensoever" and so on, as well 
as "negligence", will usually assure complete re-allocation of contractual risk 
to the plaintiff from the proferens.55 
Although the factory-owner plaintiff in Photo Productions would 
probably subscribe to an allocation of risk theory for "mere" negligence in 
relation to security guard service, it would be surprising to find a plaintiff 
prepared to accept a contract that excluded liability for deliberate destruction 
of the premises. This is exactly the post Photo Productions situation, 
however. 
Common law plaintiffs would probably echo the words of Ogilvie : 
... but more important still, remains the question of judicial tolerance of 
deliberate as well as unintentional non-performance of positive contractual 
obligations. The courts seem determined to permit the creation of illusory 
obligations in the name of freedom of contract in commercial transactions. 
Yet, given the transactional realities of modern contract making, such a policy 
is questionable from the perspectives of both the parties themselves and of the 
general public interest.56 
It is submitted that the civil law of Quebec, by contrast, adequately 
deals with this problem. Through the use of the concept of faute lourde — the 
addition of fault in contractual analysis — protection of the public interest, 
the plaintiff and a true (as opposed to illusory) bargain are assured. This 
55. "Contract-Limitation and Exclusion Clauses", (1984) 62 Can. Bar. Rev. 389, p. 396. 
56. W.,p.40l. 
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again exemplifies the basic civil law theme set out above, the theoretical and 
practical unity of civil responsibility, and ensures that interventionist judges, 
armed with public order arguments can restore a balance to contractual 
relations in the era of "mature" exclusion clauses. 
2.3.2. The Rule 
The Court of Appeal in Ceres Stevedoring v. Eisen und Metall57 set down 
the clearest statement of the use offaute lourde in the contractual context : 
I have always taken it to be an established principle under our law that a clause 
contracting out of liability for negligence is ineffective with respect to gross 
negligence or faute lourde on the ground that it is against public order.58 
[and later] 
If the principle has not yet been clearly stated by this Court it is time that such 
a statement was made. I would hold that a clause contracting out of 
responsibility for negligence is invalid with respect to gross negligence or faute 
lourde as being contrary to public policy. This would be subject to Pothier's 
definition oîfaute lourde — which should limit the application of the doctrine 
to very rare cases.59 
2.3.3. History 
Pothier's definition oî faute lourde is taken from his Œuvres60 where he 
states : 
... [L]a faute lourde, lala culpa, consiste à ne pas apporter aux affaires d'autrui 
le soin que les personnes les moins soigneuses et les plus stupides ne manquent 
pas d'apporter à leurs affaires. Cette faute est opposée à la bonne foi. 
Faute lourde in its historical sense formed one third of the théorie de la 
prestation des fautes61, derived from Roman Law, under which each contract 
was characterized by its object and a corresponding degree of fault attached. 
Under this theory, the contract of deposit, for example, was characterized 
as undertaken for the sole interest of the creditor. A debtor would thus be 
obligated to exercise mere good faith and would be responsible only in the 
event of his faute lourde. 
The second degree offault, faute légère, was equivalent to "le soin que le 
commun des hommes apporte ordinairement à ses affaires" and applied in 
57. [1977] C.A. 56. 
58. Id., p. 63. 
59. Id., p. 64. 
60. POTHIER, Œuvres, t. 2, par BUGNET, Paris, Cosse et Marchai, 1861, p. 497. 
61. Id. 
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contracts such as sale which have as their object the reciprocal interest of the 
parties. Finally "faute la plus légère" required the highest degree of care in 
contracts such as commodatum (prêt à usage) where only the debtor's interest 
is at stake. 
Although this theory engendered centuries of controversy62 in France, 
it was abandoned by the Code Napoléon and has disappeared almost entirely 
in French law and practice. As Planiol points out : 
En premier lieu, on n'a plus à rechercher si les deux parties sont intéressées 
dans le contrat, ou si une seule l'est, et qui elle est : dans tout contrat, et même 
dans toute obligation, quelle qu'en soit la source, le débiteur est tenu 
d'apporter à l'exécution de la dette les soins d'un bon père de famille, selon la 
formule de l'art. 1137." 
2.3.4. Application offaute lourde in Quebec 
Quebec did not inherit Pothier's theory of prestation des fautes. It did 
inherit faute lourde. Far from being an isolated and archaic remnant of 
another legal system, however, faute lourde now plays an important role in 
the law of exclusion clauses. 
Despite its use in the contractual setting, however, faute lourde is neither 
a purely contractual concept nor a uniquely contractual remedy for exclusion 
clauses, rather it once again underlines two basic themes in Quebec civil law 
— judicial intervention despite freedom of contract and the overlap of delict 
and contract. 
2.3.4.1. Theory of Faults 
Much of the French doctrine attempts to âeï'mt faute lourde as a purely 
contractual concept. This is due to the theory of duality of fault which 
occupies theorists since the death of the theory of prestation des fautes. As 
explained by Planiol : 
883. Opinion commune — Dans l'opinion commune on prétend trouver, à ce 
point de vue, une différence entre la faute contractuelle et la faute délictuelle. 
Les auteurs qui croient à la dualité des fautes disent qu'en matière contractuelle 
la faute n'est prise en considération qu'autant qu'elle présente un certain 
caractère de gravité, tandis qu'en matière délictuelle toute distinction disparaît, 
et l'on doit tenir compte même de la faute la plus légère. Et ils citent à ce 
propos un texte du Digeste : In lege Aquilia et culpa levissima venit (Liv. XLIV, 
tit. 9, fr. 2).64 
62. PLANIOL, Traité élémentaire de droit civil, Paris, Librairie Gén. de droit et de jurisprudence, 
1926, par. 235. 
63. A/., par. 239. 
64. A/., par. 883. 
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Unlike, the French who appear to have abandoned one ancient Roman 
theory, only to take up another, Quebec has taken a more practical 
approach. 
Rather than attempting to distinguish contractual and delictual fault by 
a purported gradation of degree, faute lourde in Quebec sets a minimum 
standard of conduct between parties for fault that may arise from delict or 
contractual breach. No exclusion clause may validly exempt or limit liability 
resulting from faulty performance falling below this minimum, regardless of 
the regime. Above the minimum standard, however, the law allows the 
parties the right of implied cumul under which the contract may delineate the 
standard of conduct in contract and delict. Here, the dualist notion of degree 
of fault is not essential. As Planiol, a French author who does not subscribe 
to the duality of fault theory, correctly points out : 
Il s'agit donc de savoir, non pas dans quelle mesure le débiteur a manqué à son 
obligation, mais bien dans quelle mesure il se trouvait lié et quelle somme de 
diligence il était tenu de fournir.65 
2.3.4.2. Fundamental Breach and obligation essentielle Distinguished 
Faute lourde is not "contractual fault" as the above analysis points out 
nor is it a contractual remedy to a breach of contractual obligations. It 
differs from the "contractual remedy" of fundamental breach at common 
law since it examines performance through a fault standard as opposed to an 
analysis of the consequences of a breach which could be characterized as a 
total failure of consideration going to the root of the contract. 
Through the use of fault, Quebec courts have also largely avoided the 
difficult problem of defining the obligation essentielle of a contract. This 
approach is outlined by Sarna : 
Un contractant ne peut pas dans un même contrat, assumer une obligation et 
s'exonérer de l'inexécution totale de cette obligation. C'est logique que nul ne 
puisse se soustraire à toute responsabilité pour défaut d'exécuter l'obligation 
essentielle qui fait l'objet d'un contrat. C'est une règle de droit et non une règle 
d'interprétation.66 
The approach of obligation essentielle, a substantive analysis of the 
contractual content, allows the court to avoid the application of an exclusion 
clause which purports to unbind the basis of the contract. In this sense it is 
similar to the fundamental breach at common law. As Sarna67 recognizes, 
65. Id., par. 884. 
66. Supra, note 37, p. 163. 
67. Id. 
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however, obligation essentielle has not been much developed in Quebec. It 
has only been applied to a rental contract68 and lease of a thing69. 
Faute lourde has two advantages over obligation essentielle which may 
account for the relative obscurity of the latter doctrine. 
First of all, courts can examine a particular standard of contractual 
performance much more easily than they can extract the "essential" element 
from various types of contracts, or more importantly from the particular 
contract in question. Rather than interpreting the "bargain" between the 
parties through substantive examination of whether the parties have created 
an illusory contract, the simple examination of the facts of performance 
using faute lourde provides a remedy. 
Secondly, obligation essentielle and fundamental breach if used as rules 
of law have the often unwanted result of destroying the contractual basis in 
an effort to avoid an exclusion clause. If the "root" of the contract or its 
"essential" nature are denied then no contract exists between the parties. By 
examining fault in performance, however, the basis of the contract and thus 
the contract itself continues to exist — the exclusion clause is merely read 
down. 
3. Faute lourde in security contracts 
3.1. Introduction 
The Quebec case law on contracts for the provision of security services 
can be divided into three basic situations where plaintiffs have attempted to 
avoid exclusion clauses that would deny or limit liability for breach. The 
following sections of this Part will examine 1) mere negligence, 2) faute 
lourde, and 3) bad faith. 
3.2. Mere Negligence 
Laiterie Artie v. Dominion Electric10 represents a case of mere negligence 
in performance of the security contract, that as it is submitted would 
engender the same result at common law and civil law. 
The plaintiff entered into a "Watchman and Manual Fire Alarm 
Service" agreement with the defendant security company under which the 
company undertook to receive a telephone signal at stated intervals from the 
68. Fried v. Blum, J.E. 78-738 (CS.). 
69. Equilease v. Bouffard, [1979] CS. 191. 
70. [1972] CA. 244. 
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plaintiffs watchman. If the signal was not received, the security company 
was to investigate or phone police. The standard form contract contained a 
limitation of liability clause : 
it is agreed by and between the parties hereto that Dominion Company is not 
an insurer, and that the rates hereinafter named are based solely on the 
probable value of the service in the operation of the system described, and in 
case of failure to perform such service and a resulting loss its liability hereunder 
shall be limited to and fixed at the sum of $50 as liquidated damages." 
Of course the watchman was overcome by thieves who blasted the 
plaintiffs safe stealing $6,500. The watchman would not transmit his signal 
as a result, but the defendant's employee in charge of receiving signals took 
no action, being "confused" as to when the signal was due. 
The limitation clause was upheld, however, and plaintiffs claim limited 
to $50. The Court held that 
[defendant's employee] could easily have checked to determine on which day 
this signal was due, and his failure to do so was certainly a fault, but was it so 
far beyond the normal range of human carelessness as to constitute faute 
lourde ? 
Judges are constantly confronted with evidence of human fallibility. Instances 
of carelessness in the best organized law firms come to light, and mistakes are 
sometimes made by the most experienced counsel. Judges are themselves 
fallible ; otherwise there would be small need for courts of appeal. The conduct 
of this employee, who relied on a faulty memory when he might have consulted 
records available to him, does not impress me as so far beyond the range of 
ordinary carelessness as to be something that the parties could not have 
contemplated when they contracted. I wonder what type of "failure to 
perform" might have been contemplated by clause 6 if it were not some 
carelessness such as that.72 
Most commentators would agree "confusion" on the part of security 
employees or even judges, can be planned for through the use of validly 
worded exclusion clauses. The fault of the employee from a delictual point of 
view, if there were no contract, would be non-existent. Although the contract 
purported to limit liability for any "failure to perform" it could be construed 
to apply to the mere omission on the facts. A more serious breach would not 
be protected by such a clearly worded clause, if such a breach could be 
characterized as faute lourde. 
J.A. Provost Inc., another Quebec security company obviously was well 
advised by its lawyers. It included a direct translation of the Dominion 
Electric clause in its standard form contracts : 
71. Id., p. 245. 
72. Id., p. 245-246. 
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Il est bien compris entre les contractants que la Compagnie n'est pas un 
assureur, les montants spécifiés dans ce contrat n'étant que pour couvrir les 
frais d'installation et de service. Advenant le cas où judiciairement la Compa-
gnie serait tenue responsable, sa responsabilité sera limitée à un maximum de 
cinquante dollars.73 
When Daniel Sevigny, a Longueuil jeweler had a Provost alarm system 
installed in his store with a direct hook-up to the security company's central 
alarm board, he probably thought his jewels were safe. After the theft of his 
inventory, it was found that the central alarm system did work as expected, 
but the security company employee : 
... d'alors a vu la lumière allumée, a observé un rythme irrégulier dans cet 
allumage et a conclu que le système était défectueux après avoir communiqué 
avec l'autre préposé dans la même pièce qui lui était de beaucoup senior.74 
The Court held this conclusion to be a mere error of judgment and the 
limitation clause was applied. 
In both Laiterie Artie and Sevigny the advocates of rational allocation 
of risk and freedom of commercial contract and probably many businessmen 
as plaintiffs or defendants would grant the validity of the limitation clause. 
Such situations, whether mere omissions or mere errors of judgment, are in 
all probability the type of risks meant to be covered by even the most basic 
exclusion clause. 
3.3. Faute lourde 
As the previous examination of the Ailsa Craig case at common law 
showed us, ports are unsafe places. It would appear that the Port of 
Montreal is especially prone to theft and requires the protection of security 
guards and locked warehouses and yards. The Ceres Stevedoring case {supra) 
is an example of faute lourde defeating an exclusion clause in the docks of 
Montreal. 
The plaintiff consignee, under a contract of carriage, did not sue the 
carrier in contract, but the carrier's agents who were the operators of a 
container terminal at Montreal. The terminal operators had received ship-
ment of the plaintiffs goods but as the judgment of the Court points out, 
took few security precautions : 
When the defendants received the container at the terminal and accepted 
custody they left it in the open beside a public road unprotected by fencing and 
totally unguarded. The heavy container weighing more than 40,000 lbs could 
only be moved by the use of a 25 ton lifter. The only 25 ton lifter in the area of 
73. Sevigny v. J.A. Provost, [1979] CS. 648. p. 649. 
74. Id. 
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shed 33 was left unattended by Ceres' employees with the engine running and 
they key in the ignition." 
The whole container was stolen. Armed with an exoneration clause that 
was in no way ambiguous or subject to any tricks of judicial construction the 
defendants pleaded lack of contractual privity, lack of negligence or 
alternatively exoneration under a clause in the bill of lading which stated : 
It is hereby expressly agreed that no servant or agent of the carrier (including 
every independent contractor from time to time employed by the carrier) shall 
in any circumstances whatsoever be under any liability whatsoever to the 
shipper, consignee or owner of the goods or to any holder of this Bill of Lading 
for any loss, damage or delay of whatsoever kind arising or resulting directly or 
indirectly/rom any act, neglect or default on his part while acting in the course 
of or in connection with his employment [ . . . ] n (emphasis added) 
Although divided upon the issue of whether the damage was delictual or 
contractual the Court of Appeal was unanimous in finding that the acts of 
the défendent amounted to faute lourde and that the exclusion clause could 
not be relied upon. In the words of Owen J. : 
In the present case the acts of the employees of Overseas and Ceres amounted 
to a failure to give to the plaintiffs container while in their possession the care 
which the least careful and the most stupid persons would not fail to give to 
their own property. The delictual acts of the employees of Overseas and Ceres 
constituted the very opposite of good faith and practically amounted to fraud. 
The most careless and the most stupid person would not in good faith leave a 
container weighing over 40,000 lbs with contents worth more than $70,000 in 
an unfenced area beside a public road with a 25 ton lift, having a key in the 
ignition and the motor running, beside the container.77 
Based on the Ceres Stevedoring approach to faute lourde, it is the 
contention of this author that Photo Productions if decided in Quebec, would 
hold the security company liable. Whether on the majority judgment of Lord 
Wilberforce using the exclusion as shield from breach argument, or the 
substantive approach of Lord Diplock — the actions of the defendants 
employee in deliberately lighting a fire in a paper factory would amount to 
faute lourde. As such, the exemption clause would automatically be avoided 
and the plaintiffs could recover the cost of their factory destroyed by fire. 
Although Ceres and Photo Productions involve commercial parties and 
large liability claims — an examination of the gravity of the negligence 
involved would lead to the conclusion that the defendant should not be 
allowed to exclude liability for acts negating the commercial purpose of 
75. Supra, note 57, p. 57. 
76. Id., p. 58. 
77. Id., p. 63. 
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contracting in the first place. Faute lourde thus restores a balance to the 
potential power of a clearly drafted exclusion clause applying in delict and 
contract. A minimum standard of performance is preserved. 
3.4. Bad Faith 
Between the clear extremes of mere omission/error of judgment on the 
one hanà faute lourde on the other, a middle ground of security cases also 
exist in Quebec. These cases present problems to judges applying the " ra te" 
{Ceres, supra) faute lourde standard. 
Professor Tetley78 commented on the problem of exclusion clauses and 
the lack of security in the Port of Montreal : 
But is it not faute lourde if there is continued theft and lack of care in the port 
of Montreal with the result that Montreal's reputation is unenviable? Is it not 
fraudulent for carriers to intentionally maintain, year after year, their admit-
tedly negligent practices in the port of Montreal? 
Does not the same negligence with abandon and intent over a period of time 
become gross negligence? Is there good faith (bonnefoi) in accordance with 
Pothier's definition? Is it not fraudulent for carriers, stevedores and terminal 
agents who are aware of the conditions in the port and their own lack of care, 
not to change their practices?79 
In the Prinz Wilhelm IIP0 consignee of a bill of lading sued the carrier, 
ships agent and stevedores when the latter received 37 cartons of ski boots at 
their port of Montreal shed but only delivered I8/2 cartons three days later. 
It was found by the trial judge and not disputed by the defendants that the 
goods were pilfered. 
The defendants relied on an exemption clause in the bill of lading which 
stated : 
2. PERIOD OF RESPONSIBILITY. The carrier's responsibility [...] shall 
terminate without notice as soon as the goods leave the ship's tackle. 
Goods in custody of the carrier, [...] after discharge, and whether awaiting 
shipment, landed or stored [...] shall be deemed to be in such custody at the 
entire risk of the shipper and/or consignee.81 
An exemption clause in the stevedores advice notice also passed on the 
risk: 
78. "The Himalaya Clause stipulaiion pour autrui, Non-Responsibility Clauses and Gross 
Negligence under the Civil Code", (1979) 20 C de D. 449. 
79. Id., p. 465. 
80. [1973] 2 Lloyds L.R. 124 (Que. CA.). 
81. Id.,p. 127. 
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The above-mentioned goods have arrived and remain at owners' risk of fire, 
flood, pilferage or damage from any cause whatsoever. If goods are not 
removed within five days from time of loading they may be trucked to store at 
Owner's Risk and expense.82 
The plaintiff brought its action in both delict and contract but was 
unsuccessful on all counts. The carrier's contractual liability was held to be 
limited by the bill of lading and a faute lourde argument was rejected since no 
negligence was found. The ships agents and stevedores were held not at fault 
in contract or delict and thus it became unnecessary to even consider the 
exemption clauses. 
A finding of total lack of fault is somewhat surprising in the cir-
cumstances. One commentator summed up this case in the following 
manner : 
The Court did not believe there was any fault on behalf of stevedores or 
terminal agent although there was considerable evidence in the record of 
confusion in the shed, of elderly underpaid watchmen who testified that they 
only "watched" but did not act if they saw any pilfering because they were only 
paid as "watchmen", etc. The chaos was considered negligence but normal all 
the same.83 
In the Federal Scheide84 when 5 tons of copper wire were stolen from 
nine 5,000 lb shipping containers in the port of Montreal, the defendant 
stevedores relied upon the carriers "Himalaya clause" in the bill of lading. 
The clause was well drafted and contained sufficient mentions of "what-
soever", "any loss", "any damage" and "any act neglect or default"85. The 
trial judge recognized Montreal's "not particularly good" reputation86 in 
terms of theft and noted that the Ceres Stevedoring container was stolen at 
approximately the same time. Security precautions taken by the defendant 
were described as "minimal" 87 with storage in an unfenced and poorly 
guarded area : 
Reverting for a moment to the quality of the special guards hired by the private 
security firm retained by defendant Stevedoring. These men appeared to have 
been all of a certain age who normally during the winter months would work 
as guards in institutions in order to avoid outside work during the cold 
Montreal winter months. The guard assigned to the 12 hour watch would 
certainly have been obliged to leave the place under his scrutiny during those 
12 hours. If he was seated in an automobile, his eyes might have been closed by 
sleep or he might have been threatened or paid to keep them closed. 
82. Id., p. 125. 
83. TETLEY, supra, note 78, p. 467. 
84. [1978] 1 Lloyds L.R. 285 (CS.). 
85. Id. 
86. Id.,-p. 286. 
87. Id. 
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Admittedly, one seems here to be entering the realm of conjecture but when 
reminded that this theft involved the removal of at least five tons of material, 
the probabilities are that some "inside" co-operation must have been achieved 
by the thieves to effect the abstraction of such heavy and cumbersome material. 
And, again, such a possibility is consistent with the record of heavy loss of 
cargo at the port of Montreal during that time.88 
The trial judge found clear negligence on the part of the stevedores. 
Their "imprudence neglect and want of skill"8 9 was evidenced in the 
unprotected area of storage and lack of efficient guards considering the 
valuable merchandise. Applying Pothier's definition in Ceres {supra) and 
Laiterie Artie {supra), however, no faute lourde was found. Since in fact a 
security service had been used, albeit a less than sufficient or reasonable 
service, the defendants action was characterized as negligent but not grossly 
negligent or amounting to faute lourde. 
The Tarantel90 is the final port of Montreal security case to be examined 
in this section. Ninety-four cartons of electrical goods, weighing between 
20-30 lbs a carton were stolen from the defendant stevedore's warehouse. To 
avoid the protection of a Himalaya clause purporting to exclude liability, the 
plaintiffs claimed gross negligence//au?e lourde in the provision of security 
services for the goods. 
The trial judge began by examining regulations of the National Harbours 
Board which required minimum security checks at two hour intervals in all 
sheds, inspection of trucks leaving the premises, and padlocked security 
lockers. The defendant had in response to these requirements hired 
Pinkertons Ltd. to provide uniformed guard service. The contract called for 
the provision of one guard to protect four sheds. This guard could make his 
rounds in a manner that met the minimum requirements of the Harbours 
Board. No additional guards were hired, however, due to cost considerations. 
On the facts before him, Walsh J. found clear negligence on the part of 
the stevedores in providing security services which were characterized by one 
expert as insufficient to the point of non-existence. Due to an anomaly in the 
Himalaya clause, however, the question of claiming protection under the 
exclusion of liability was not answered and pure delictual responsibility was 
found. Had the exclusion been applicable, however, the court went on to 
observe in obiter that 
[The defendants] 
... knew or must be deemed to have known of the frequency of thefts from 
sheds in the Port of Montreal at the time, they had been warned in advance that 
88. Id., p. 288. 
89. Id, p. 289. 
90. [1978] 1 F.C. 269. 
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cargo of a nature to be easily stolen would be in their sheds at a certain time 
and requested to place same in the special security locker which was done. 
Having done this they were content to protect this merchandise at night by 
merely having one guard normally stationed at a gate nearly half a mile from 
the shed in question and who only made inspection tours of the shed every two 
hours at regular intervals. The presence of another guard during the night for 
the shed in question, or more specifically in the vicinity of the security locker in 
the shed, would certainly have made the theft, in the manner in which it was 
apparently carried out, impossible. I am inclined to believe that even the least 
careful and most stupid person would have engaged another guard at least for 
the nights in question, and that the theft was a direct consequence of failure to 
do this." 
3.4.1. Discussion 
It is clear from an examination of the above three cases, that the Port of 
Montreal is not a safe place. Often, it is the stevedoring companies who are 
responsible for this state of affairs : in the Prinz Wilhelm III, watchmen 
watch pilfering but do not stop it, in the Federal Scheide security guards of a 
"certain age" whose eyes were closed by sleep or money on a 12 hour shift 
failed to see the theft of 5 tons of material, and in the Tarentel, one guard was 
expected to patrol a one half mile route because the stevedoring company 
didn't want to hire more. 
Trial judges, when presented with evidence as to the sorry state of 
affairs on the docks have taken three different approaches. In the Prinz 
Wilhelm III, pilferage was seen as so normal as to give rise to no 
responsibility for the defendant. The inadequate guard service in the Federal 
Scheide was found to have amounted to negligence on the part of the 
defendants, but since a guard had in fact been supplied, this negligence was 
characterized as at least befitting the least careful and most stupid member 
of society. It was only in the Tarantel that the perfunctory provision of a 
guard, who by definition could not guard, was recognized as amounting to 
faute lourde. 
Perhaps in situations such as that of Montreal's port area the second 
aspect of Pothier's definition of faute lourde should not be ignored. Not only 
must the "least careful and most stupid" test be satisfied, but as Pothier 
continued, "Cette faute est opposée à la bonne foi"92 [emphasis in the 
original]. 
An unsafe dock does not become so as a result of mere errors of 
judgment or omissions as in the Laiterie Artie and Sevigny cases discussed 
91. Id., p. 295. 
92. Supra, note 60. 
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above. On the contrary, where the dock is "known" as unsafe due to theft 
and pilferage — good faith in contracting requires extra security to protect 
plaintiffs goods. 
In most security contracts, when viewed separately, the mere provision 
of guard service would meet the admittedly low standard of "least careful 
and most stupid". Deliberate acts of theft or pyromania by the security 
guards should of course amount to faute lourde. The requirement of "good 
faith" in security service may, however, entail that defendants in problem 
areas such as the port of Montreal, do something more to meet the 
minimum. Watchmen that merely watch theft, or who don't detect the theft 
of 5 tons of heavy and cumbersome goods when stationed beside the goods, 
or who might as well be non-existent ; all should not be able to shelter behind 
an exclusion clause. As Professor Tetley points out, such situations when 
viewed from their inception rather than in isolation become tainted with bad 
faith : 
It is submitted that the Courts should no longer accept as "normal" or la 
coutume the intentional confusion in the port of Montreal, the intentionally 
low paid, unqualified, often token watchmen, [...] the intentional disregard for 
care of cargo. This system, this repetition of events is not negligence but gross 
negligence or faule lourde. [...] opposed to good faith. It is submitted that it is 
not good faith because it is a condition that carriers and their agents — the 
stevedores and terminal agents — intentionally take advantage of and are 
responsible for.93 
Conclusion 
Article 300 of the Draft Civil Code would codify the jurisprudential rule 
on faute lourde and exclusion clauses : 
300. No person may exclude or limit his responsibility when it results from 
intentional or gross fault. 
Although it may appear anachronistic that a late twentieth century 
codai revision purports to distinguish degrees of fault or bring fault analysis 
into contract law — it has been the thesis of this paper that the civil law of 
Quebec uses judicial intervention through public order and the unity of 
delict and contract to ensure that freedom of contract can survive the well 
drafted exclusion clause. 
Faute lourde as defined by Pothier and applied in Quebec has withstood 
the test of time and evolved into a useful tool in the commercial setting. It is 
submitted that the definition as used by Quebec courts is superior to more 
modern approaches, for example, the statutory 'faute équivalente au dor or 
93. Supra, note 78, p. 482. 
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"faute inexcusable" as used in air law94. The latter concept, which is defined 
as "deliberate fault involving knowledge of the probability of damage and its 
reckless acceptance without valid reason" — approaches wilfull misconduct, 
and could very rarely be applied. Faute lourde, although rare, would be more 
useful to preserve good faith in contracting and to provide a remedy for 
conduct falling short of wilfull breach. 
The Quebec Court of Appeal in Telemontage Inc. v. Air Canada95, 
perhaps in a recognition of this critique, was willing to use Pothier's 
definition offaute lourde to avoid a limitation of liability, when interpreting 
the phrase "faute équivalente au dol" as it appears in the unamended 
article 25 of the Warsaw Convention. 
The Federal Court, trial division, in Swiss Bank Corporation v. Air 
Canada96, on the other hand, chose to adopt an "international" definition 
which was sufficient to ground liability in the circumstances, but would 
normally be much too restrictive. 
Whereas the defendant, Air Canada, was held to have provided 
inadequate security precautions for the protection of valuable banknotes in 
their care, this did not amount to an act or omission "done with intent to 
cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably 
result"97. The defendant was held liable only because the above standard 
also applied to the acts of its employees, and the court found that employees 
had stolen the banknotes. 
Such an approach would have caught the pyromaniac watchman in 
Photo Productions, but is unclear whether the negligent employees in Ceres 
Stevedoring, who did not steal the goods themselves, would have been held 
to have been "reckless". Faute lourde, on the other hand, is sufficient to 
catch both situations. 
Fault analysis allows the judge to apply a simple test to contractual 
performance, and avoids the difficulties of common law fundamental breach 
or civil law obligation essentielle. By using a deliberately low standard of 
"most stupid and least careful", interference by judges in contractual 
allocation of risk will be rare — but the deliberate act of the Photo 
Productions watchman would result in liability. Use of the "good faith" 
section of Pothier's definition should also allow recovery where "business as 
usual" in a particular area may require a higher standard. Application of this 
latter refinement should not open the floodgates of judicial intervention. 
94. For an analysis of these concepts see HAANAPPEL, "Note", (1982) 7 Annals A. and S.L. 533. 
95. (1982) Annals A. and S.L. 592 (Que. CA.). 
96. (1982) 129 D.L.R. (3d) 85 (F.C.T.D.). 
97. Id, p. 105. 
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At common law, attempts to insert equity into the law of contracts 
through rules of construction or fundamental breach have not survived 
Photo Productions. A well drafted clause can exclude or limit liability in tort 
or contract for anything short of fraud. Far from upholding freedom of 
contract, it is submitted that in certain cases, denial of responsibility in a 
standard form exclusion clause may destroy the basis of the bargain in the 
eyes of the plaintiff. A security guard hired to prevent fires who instead 
deliberately lights one would be a good example. 
To some extent, the common law is attempting to allow redress to 
plaintiffs. In post-Photo Production, Great Britain judges may look to 
statutes such as The Unfair Contract Terms Act or the "fair and reasonable" 
requirement of the Sale of Goods Act. Applying the latter Act in the leading 
post-Photoproductions exclusion clause case of George Mitchell (Chesterhall) 
v. Finney Lock Seeds98 the House of Lords first reiterated its statements on 
the sanctity of exclusion clauses, then struck down the clause as not fair or 
reasonable under the statute. Rather than applying an abstract test of 
reasonableness the court looked at factors that could also used to describe 
the beginnings oï a. faute lourde analysis : 
The question whether it is fair or reasonable to allow reliance on a term 
excluding or limiting liability for a breach of contract can only arise after the 
breach. The nature of the breach and the circumstances in which it occurred 
cannot possibly be excluded from "all the circumstances of the case" to which 
regard must be had ." 
The Canadian common law has also tentatively begun to use a non 
statutory concept of unreasonableness as a bar to enforceability of an 
exclusion clause in some circumstances. In the security services case of 
Davidson v. The Three Spruces Realty Ltd. 10° the plaintiffs deposited valuables 
in the defendant's safety deposit vaults. The defendant represented to 
depositors that absolute safety was assured and that it was even unnecessary 
to insure valuables stored. 
An exclusion clause in the written contract, excluded liability for : 
... any theft, robbery, embezzlement, loss or destruction of, or any injury or 
damage whatsoever to any papers or property which may at any time be 
deposited or stored in the box or held by the lessor under clause 11 below, or 
for any act, neglect, or omission whatsoever of the lessor or its officers, agent 
and servants, or of the tenant or any deputy or any stranger.101 
98. [1983] 2 All E.R. 737. 
99. Id., p. 743. 
100. (1978) 79 D.L.R. (3d) 481 (B.C.S.C). 
101. Id, p. 487. 
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Defendant attempted to rely on this clause after the inevitable robbery, 
even though negligence was proven which amounted to almost non-existent 
security. Persons were free to enter the vaults without identification, thefts 
had in fact taken place but none of the plaintiffs were warned, indeed the 
defendant brought no evidence to show that any precautions had been taken 
to protect plaintiffs valuables from theft. 
Applying a test of "reasonableness" the exemption clause was struck 
out. Mr. Justice Anderson held that : 
The point has been reached in the development of the common law where, in 
my opinion, the Courts may say, in certain circumstances, that the terms of a 
contract, although perfectly clear, will not be enforced because they are entirely 
unreasonable. [...] [And further,] Even if the limitation clause was such as to 
protect the bailee against conduct amounting to a fundamental breach, the 
clause is, in all the circumstances, so offensive to all right-thinking persons that 
the Courts will hold that to allow the bailee to rely on the limitation clause 
would be unconscionable and an abuse of freedom of contract.102 
It is submitted that when common law courts begin using phrases such 
as "all the circumstances", "offensive to all right thinking persons" and 
"abuse of freedom of contract", they are moving closer to examining faulty 
performance through the optic of public order and a contractual standard of 
care of good faith. Such an approach is necessary if the common law is to 
move towards a more general "law of obligations," as one commentator 
suggests l03 wherein traditional compartments separating tort and contract 
give way to a general theory and practice of "civil liability". 
Quebec civil law accepted the exclusion clause only reluctantly. From 
the beginning, exclusion of liability conflicted with concepts of public order. 
The "weighty" jurisprudence in such clauses until the mid-twentieth century 
amounted to two obiter unabashedly embracing the common law. 
Despite this inauspicious beginning, the ubiquitous clauses have become 
an aspect of commercial reality in the 80's. The common law, however, is 
now stymied by its reliance upon freedom of contract theories in an age of 
the perfectly drafted exclusion clause. Legislators and judges are now 
searching for a new method to avoid unreasonable results. Quebec by 
comparison has evolved beyond the common law, yet has remained true to 
the doctrinal roots of the civilian system. 
Although a hybrid of delict and contract, faute lourde has proven its 
usefulness in the regulation of contractual relations. Unlike fundamental 
breach or obligation essentielle, courts need not examine the root of the 
bargain — destroying the contract in the process. Like the exclusion clause, 
102. Id, p. 492-494. 
103. REITER, supra, note 3, p. 310. 
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it crosses the boundaries of delict and contract. A combination of public 
order and Roman concepts of contractual fault —faute lourde is now in 
renaissance. 
Ultimately, faute lourde also preserves the sanctity of freedom of 
contract even when invalidating exclusion clauses. By ensuring a minimum 
standard of performance and a minimum of good faith the plaintiff does not 
feel totally cheated of his "bargain". In a era of the perfect exclusion clause 
even the least careful and most stupid businessman would not hire a 
pyromaniac to protect his factory from fire. 
